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Towards a Non-Baudrillard: 
Theoretical Violence and the Gift 
Matthew J. King
Abstract: Against the difficulty of  thinking outside conditions of  the contemporary age, this paper develops a 
non-philosophical cloning of  concepts introduced in Jean Baudrillard’s philosophy, with the aim of  introducing 
a (counter-)gift against the present system’s reproduction. Rather than locating a revolutionary subject in the 
conditions of  reference determined by the (capitalist) system, but also rejecting the catastrophic and nihilis-
tic counter-gifts proposed by Baudrillard himself, this paper performs a cloning of  a philosophical decision 
implicitly present in Baudrillard’s thinking between symbolic exchange (that which haunts the system), and 
sign-exchange/political economy (the system itself  and its simulations), towards developing a non-classical 
revolutionary “subject” rooted in a plurality of  knowledge practices. The cloning presents two new first names 
of  the Real as “exchanged-without-exchange” and “(counter-)gifted-without-giftedness.” These are then taken 
as tools for orienting thought for imagining the outside of  a capitalist/semiotic decision and bringing forth 
an unbound “man-to-come.” The paper thus situates future post-capitalist planning within a democracy of  
knowledge practices irreducible to the practices of  thinking promoted by the system alone. These are already 
“(counter-)gifted-without-giftedness” to resist, with a theoretical, but not fatal, violence, the congealed thinking 
of  status quo capitalism and fantastical unplanned alternatives.
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Introduction 
Jean Baudrillard’s philosophy has, to some degree, fallen out of  fashion in the con-temporary scene and his theory is no lon-
ger as prevalent as French contemporaries Badi-
ou, Derrida, Deleuze and so on. This is perhaps 
because of  a turn from radical politics towards 
a nihilistic and ironized pessimism which, ac-
cording to Anthony King, demonstrated “ex-
actly what critical theorists must not do”1 and, 
according to Scott Lash, actually proliferated an 
“uncritical and even irresponsible celebration”2 
of  the postmodern. His philosophy no longer 
seems as radical, but it remains interesting to re-
consider him as a quintessential thinker of  the 
end times. This involves critically reassessing 
many of  the strategies that he proposed against 
those conditions he diagnosed which have re-
mained inescapable even today, including the 
intractability of  modern capitalism and cynical 
nihilism in particular. 
Whilst such analysis should not return to Bau-
drillard merely to repeat him, the inquiry envi-
sions something more radical in a rethinking 
of  his basic philosophical concepts from a 
“non-philosophical” perspective, putting him 
into communication and exchange with contem-
porary concerns in new and previously uncon-
ceived ways. The project undertaken thus seeks 
to reconstruct Baudrillard via François Laruel-
le’s non-philosophy, conducted through a dual-
ysis of  Baudrillard’s concepts of  symbolic ex-
change and sign-exchange, gift and counter-gift. 
The purpose, from a pragmatic perspective, be-
ing to develop a revolutionary subject evading 
the coordinates of  the current capitalist system 
and its so-called “reality,” the need for such a 
subject being justified in the first section out of  
the apparent failures of  Baudrillard’s fatalistic 
post-structuralist renunciation.
1 Anthony King, “Baudrillard’s Nihilism and the End of  
Theory,” Telos: Critical Theory of  the Contemporary, 112 (1998): 
89-106.
2 Scott Lash, Sociology of  Postmodernism (Oxon: Routledge, 
2013), 2. 
Conceiving of  this subject, close readings of  
Baudrillard’s theoretical concepts (the code, sign 
exchange and symbolic exchange alongside his 
proposal of  “fatal strategies”) will be attempted 
and followed by a justification of  their relative 
limitations. A non-philosophical cloning of  the 
materials of  Baudrillard’s philosophy of  sign 
and symbolic exchange, gift and counter-gift, 
marks a key step towards the revitalization of  
Baudrillardian anti-capitalism. Yet, any new rev-
olutionary subject, to be existing beyond the 
system’s auto-critique and rendering achievable 
an alternative future to our contemporary cap-
italist horizon, ought not be recognizable in a 
classical sense (that is, be representational and 
naively divided from objects in a leftover from 
dualist metaphysics), as shall be demonstrated. 
How, prior to all this though, might two very 
different thinkers be aligned in the interests of  
a common task? 
Theoretical violence
Such alignment is conceivable around the ques-
tion of  heresy against the manifest and an as-
sessment of  whether radical thought ought to 
be “theoretically violent/terroristic,” this being 
defined as a radical (“violent”) dismantling of  
manifest and ordinary ways of  thinking and the-
orizing, forcing significant reorientation. It is 
hard to neatly define this without already under-
mining its intention by returning to theoretical 
clichés which might undermine said “violence” 
in returning to convention. The best way of  
capturing it, however, is by way of  explicating 
a Deleuzian approach of  giving to a thinker “a 
child that would be his own offspring, yet mon-
strous,”3 but understood at the level not just of  
mutated thinkers, but also of  a society or politics 
as a whole. To be theoretically violent is then to 
take seriously the apparent nihilism or closure 
of  conditions but, using these very conditions, 
to mutate them in some way that shows them 
only instead as contingent, as something which 
is mutated to be ‘monstrous’ against its apparent 
3 Gilles Deleuze, Negotiations: 1972-1990, trans. Martin 
Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 6.
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closure and completeness. This article moves 
from the term monstrous towards the term of  
“violence” because of  associations between vio-
lence and terror(ism), the latter being something 
which can be used to orient both thinkers, and 
the former something which, in their own ways, 
their theory could be accused of  lacking, even in 
this theoretical way. 
Laruelle, considering this violence/terrorism 
with regard to theory complains in interview 
with Derrida that “[y]ou tell me that I am prac-
ticing terror […but in fact there] are two read-
ings of  my text, obviously. There is a philosoph-
ical reading, one in which I do practice terror. 
And there is a non-philosophical reading, which 
is obviously my reading. And from the latter 
point of  view, I am reluctant to concede that I 
am practicing terror.”4 He denies an accusation 
of  terror, suggesting it to be a misunderstanding 
and implying the terroristic act is in fact phil-
osophical rather than non-philosophical. His 
project was not to declare war on philosophy, 
to engender fear in it by bringing it to an ex-
ecution (a question of  a complete rejection of  
philosophy) nor to petrify/“terrorize” it. Rather, 
it was primarily a specific employment of  philoso-
phy. Philosophy in the service of  a kind of  sub-
ject in a non-classical sense, “Ordinary man […] 
stripped of  his qualities or attributes by a wholly 
positive sufficiency” but not stripped of  “his es-
sence,”5 and thereby of  the means or want to 
practice philosophy altogether. 
Non-philosophy is merely the corresponding 
mode of  practice enabling one to do this, and it 
is the alternative (philosophy) which, for Laruel-
le, could be considered terroristic since it pushes 
everything to signify for the system at hand, as a 
4 François Laruelle and Jacques Derrida, “Controversy over 
the Possibility of  a Science of  Philosophy,” trans. Robin 
Mackay, https://pervegalit.files.wordpress.com/2008/06/
laruelle-derrida.pdf, 5. 
5 François Laruelle, “A Rigorous Science of  Man,” in From 
Decision to Heresy, ed. and trans. Robin Mackay (Falmouth: 
Urbanomic, 2012), 48.
result of  the structure of  philosophical sufficien-
cy (auto-determination of  philosophy discussed 
later). Laruelle’s practice is heretical in resisting 
forced signification into invariant structures, but 
wishes to be neither terroristic nor theoretically 
violent, at least insofar as it does not belong to 
a structural violence of  philosophy and its pro-
duction of  a petrified inability to think outside 
present coordinates. To consider a non-philoso-
phy as a mode of  “terror” itself  in a more posi-
tive way, striking fear into a corrupt, oppressive 
or elsewise congealed system preserving certain 
binaries and power structures is not necessarily 
something Laruelle is interested in doing, at least 
directly.
Conversely Baudrillard, contra Laruelle, revels in 
such a “terroristic” position, naming himself  ex-
plicitly as “a terrorist and nihilist in theory.”6 In-
deed, his self-description seems warranted both 
in terms of  his criticism of  popular Marxist 
and structuralist thought, striking fear into any 
proposed escape from or critique of  the system 
within their coordinates (or decision(s), in Laru-
elle’s terminology) and his violent pessimism, 
arguing such escape is possible only through 
so-called “fatal” strategies, which I address lat-
er. Unlike Laruelle’s heresy, however, Baudrillard 
actually falls short of  weaponizing what he also 
names “[t]heoretical violence,”7 giving us instead 
only strategies that are superficially violent instead 
of  genuinely violent against the status quo. He 
produces strategies that are largely impotent for 
striking fear into the capitalist system or the con-
gealed form of  theorizing that accompanies it. 
Against this, the project of  a non-Baudrillard is 
one which emphasizes the potential radicality of  
a theoretical violence which might in fact re-es-
tablish potent opposition to the status quo, as in 
Baudrillard, yet relinquish its reliance on fatality 
6 Jean Baudrillard, Simulacra & Simulation, trans. Sheila Faria 
Glaser (Michigan: The University of  Michigan Press, 1994), 
163.
7 Ibid. 
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and fatal strategy which held him back. Laruelle, 
rather than Baudrillard, was the properly hereti-
cal thinker, but Baudrillard, rather than Laruelle, 
began from a (philosophical) perspective much 
more rooted in urgent contemporary concerns 
(particularly those of  the questions of  capitalist 
realism, terror and crisis in meaning), presenting 
an ambition for radicality which was laudable, 
but lacking in concrete praxis which was con-
cerning. An adequate synthesis is rendered pos-
sible through an elucidation of  this new subject 
hinted at above and named the “man-to-come.” 
Initially though, a detailed elucidation and criti-
cism of  the concepts of  a standard (philosoph-
ical) Baudrillard requires attention. With the 
alignment of  the thinkers and an elucidation of  
a general project now complete, that analysis can 
finally take place. 
Baudrillard 
The section is split into two. It first considers 
Baudrillard’s political economy of  the sign and 
how it unearths the limitations of  Marxism and 
the reign of  semiotics. This will define the em-
ployment of  the code and sign exchange in Bau-
drillard and commence an analysis of  symbolic 
exchange, highlighting its potential utility for ar-
ticulating a new kind of  anti-capitalism. The end 
of  this part indicates to the contrary the failures 
of  this and why it resulted instead in a turn to 
fatal strategy, particularly due to the limitations 
of  Baudrillard’s “anagrammatic” approach. The 
second subsection considers these fatal strate-
gies, including the acceleration of  the subject’s 
demise, terror and fiction-theory in particular, 
addressing their impotence and justifying the 
need for a new subject facilitating a turn to 
non-Baudrillard.  
Political economy of  the sign 
Baudrillard employs the concept of  a “code” in 
referring to system(s) of  control which consti-
tute the “reality” we experience. Andrew Rob-
inson interprets Baudrillard’s theory of  the code 
as a system which “rests on a claim to program-
matic infallibility – the ability to pre-programme 
reality. It is a “total descriptive universe.”8 The 
concept changes subtly throughout Baudril-
lard’s career, but it is given even as early as The 
System of  Objects, where he argues that the “ob-
jects-cum-advertising system” of  consumer 
society is “basically a code,”9 one which is “a 
universal system for the identification of  social 
rank: the code of  ‘status’.”10 Here he distin-
guishes the code from the system of  language, 
suggesting that it lacks the necessary syntax.11 
Later, however, it becomes clear the distinction 
is not as obvious. To see why, it is necessary to 
approach Baudrillard’s turn to structuralism to 
articulate the functioning of  the code. 
Baudrillard, taking a two-sided distinction in the 
functioning of  the sign developed by Ferdinand 
de Saussure12 proposes two dimensions along 
which language may be understood: 
The structural dimension of  language 
(L1): any term is relative to any other 
term, “internal to the system and consti-
tuted by binary oppositions.”13
The functional dimension of  language 
(L2): every term is related to what it des-
ignates. 
L1 refers to relations between signifiers (Sr) 
whilst L2 designates the function of  the signi-
8 Andrew Robinson, “An A to Z of  Theory: Jean 
Baudrillard: The Code,” Ceasefire Magazine (April 2012), 
https://ceasefiremagazine.co.uk/in-theory-baudrillard-5.
9 Jean Baudrillard, The System of  Objects, trans. James 
Benedict (London: Verso, 2005), 212 [Le Système des 
objets (Paris: Gallimard, 1968), 270.] Reference to French 
editions given for selected texts where their position in 
Baudrillard’s oeuvre is relevant. 
10 Ibid., [271].  
11 Ibid., [270]. 
12 Ferdinand de Saussure, Course in General Linguistics, trans. 
Roy Harris (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 76-77.
13 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange and Death, trans. Iain 
Hamilton Grant (London: Sage Publications, 2017), 28.
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fied (Sd), meaning that which is denoted by the 
word. Together they constitute the concept of  
the sign. For Baudrillard, L2 mirrors Marxian 
theorization of  use-value (UV), playing “the 
role of  the horizon and the finality of  the sys-
tem of  exchange-values” (EV),14 suggesting that 
L2 also finalizes structural relations held togeth-
er by L1. This is a significant identification and 
is introduced because Baudrillard defends the 
idea that, as Anthony King puts it, theory “must 
go beyond Marx to see that claims to material 
objectivity are themselves part of  capitalist he-
gemony.”15 Baudrillard wishes to justify this in 
maintaining that ideology “can no longer be 
understood as an infra-superstructural relation 
between a material production (system and re-
lations of  production) and a production of  
signs (culture, etc.), which expresses and masks 
the constitution at the ‘base’.”16 In other words, 
ideology is not, for Baudrillard, the masking 
over of  “true” material conditions at the base, 
but rather the “very form that traverses both.”17 
Ideology thereby “lies already whole in the relation 
of  EV to UV, that is, in the logic of  the commod-
ity, as is so in the relation of  Sr to Sd, i.e., in 
the internal logic of  the sign.”18 It is precisely 
these oppositions (EV to UV, Sr to Sd), repro-
duced at different levels, which highlight the 
structuring of  any critique of  ideology as always 
already structured ideologically, i.e. that attempts to 
critique the alienation at the level of  exchange, 
or in the systems of  cultural capital picked out 
in L1, cannot simply be conducted from a pos-
ited pure viewpoint of  “material objectivity” 
itself. This would perhaps explain why material 
analysis (and revealed contradictions) do not, 
on their own, produce adequate opposition to 
social, economic and emerging environmental 
14 Ibid.
15 Anthony King, “Baudrillard’s Nihilism,” 90. 
16 Jean Baudrillard, For a Critique of  the Political Economy of  
the Sign, trans. Charles Levin (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1981), 
143; [Pour une critique de l’économie politique du signe (Paris: 
Gallimard, 1972), 173].  
17 Ibid., 144 [173]. 
18 Ibid. [174].  
catastrophes, since the true functioning logic 
of  the “material” system is always already ob-
scured. If  this is convincing, what would be the 
path of  escape? Baudrillard’s bind seems to mir-
ror the bind of  “capitalist realism” identified by 
Mark Fisher and Slavoj Žižek,19 a defining issue 
of  our time requiring theoretically violent strate-
gic responses. Baudrillard’s most productive but 
ultimately impotent proposal for addressing this 
was to try understanding capitalism, and its sign 
logic granting objects a kind of  “aura”20 funda-
mentally connected to the reproduction of  class, 
in terms of  the obfuscation of  a more funda-
mental third form of  exchange, one which was 
symbolic rather than sign-related or economic.
Whereas for Baudrillard sign exchange oper-
ates with the split between L1 and L2, Sr and Sd, 
where the primary term (L1) represents the play 
of  signifiers (general equivalent) and L2 mere-
ly sustains the fantasy of  a real kernel beyond 
L1, symbolic exchange, characteristic according 
to Baudrillard of  primitive societies, operates 
differently. The reduction of  meaning to gen-
eral equivalency, one that is always deferred, is 
the logic and functioning of  sign exchange, yet 
conversely symbolic exchange is supposed to 
function in terms of  a “collective movement of  
exchanges,” as opposed to exchange function-
ing expressed in “the law of  the Father and the 
individual psychical reality principle.”21 In other 
words, symbolic exchange is a social exchange 
without general equivalent (in law), i.e. without 
a totalizing structure. It does, however, still have 
a general structure apparent with each individ-
ual exchange. This is best identified in Marcel 
Mauss’s theory of  the gift as “the obligation 
to give, the obligation to receive and recipro-
cate.”22 For Baudrillard, symbolic exchange is a 
19 Mark Fisher, Capitalist Realism: Is There No Alternative? 
(Winchester: Zero Books, 2009); Slavoj Žižek, Like a Thief  
in Broad Daylight (London: Allen Lane, 2018).
20 Baudrillard, For A Critique, 120 [140].
21 Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, 156. 
22 Marcel Mauss, The Gift, trans. W. D. Halls (Oxon: 
Routledge, 2002), 50. 
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form of  gift and counter-gift and the fatal strat-
egies introduced later are formed as a kind of  
“counter-gift” to what the system “gifts” us, an 
attempt to re-introduce an antagonistic dimen-
sion against its supposed totalizing identity. It is 
through this maneuver that Baudrillard hopes 
to escape the “orgy of  differences” making up 
what he terms the “‘invention’ of  the Other,”23 
something noticeably important in a contempo-
rary situation where alternative futures feel in-
conceivable and there is no proper antagonistic 
force contra general equivalency. 
There is, however, a significant issue with this 
“primitive” symbolic exchange which might be 
said to haunt the general equivalency of  an im-
potent present. Steven Best and Douglas Kellner 
characterize this in their criticism of  Baudrillard 
through the word “dreaming,” which cannot but 
convey the proposal’s naivety: “Baudrillard is 
positing – or dreaming of  – another break in his-
tory as radical as the rupture between symbolic 
societies and capitalism which would constitute 
a return to symbolic societies as his revolution-
ary alternative.”24 This is “dreaming” because, as 
Baudrillard himself  seems to recognize, if  one is 
not able to “give anything back,” that is, return 
the gift (counter-gift) to capital, “they are noth-
ing,” and since humans have “put an end to this 
dual relation”25 by being subsumed, according to 
Baudrillard’s totalizing logic, by general equiva-
lence, escape strategies have, rather than become 
revolutionary, instead become impossible (or else 
based purely on contingency or chance). “Ev-
erything starts from impossible exchange. 
The uncertainty of  the world lies in the fact that 
it has no equivalent anywhere.”26 There might 
23 Jean Baudrillard, The Transparency of  Evil, trans. Chris 
Turner (London: Verso, 1993), 124.
24 Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: 
Critical Interrogations (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991), 115-6. 
25 Jean Baudrillard, The Intelligence of  Evil, trans. Chris 
Turner (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 148.
26 Jean Baudrillard, Impossible Exchange, trans. Chris Turner 
(London: Verso, 2001): 3. 
be “another break in history” but there is no 
means of  controlling it, of  revitalizing the “Dual 
Form” (“revisability internal to the irreversible 
movement of  the real”).27 
This dual form, symbolic exchange, thus haunts 
the sign exchange (and its maximal logic, that 
of  the simulacrum, complete disappearance of  
reality) but hence always already appears lost, 
resulting only in “dreaming.” At this point, it is 
hard to see how radical politics could be satisfied 
with this bleak and totalizing account, although 
it might be tempting in light of  recent revolu-
tionary failures. Yet, Baudrillard does not intend 
to suggest there is no appropriate strategy to re-
vive it. Instead, there is an anagrammatic strate-
gy and a turn later to “fatal” strategy which must 
also be assessed. 
Firstly, it is necessary to briefly address the ana-
grammatic, understood as a way of  revitalizing 
the symbolic through a reestablishment of  a 
mode of  poetic language which is not language 
in its current signifying form (signifier/signified, 
L1 and L2). Baudrillard explicates Saussure’s the-
ory of  anagrams28 extending their application 
beyond Saussure’s analysis of  Saturnine poetry 
towards a general strategy mirroring the prim-
itive symbolic gift-exchange outlined above. 
Illustrating how anagrammatic strategy is in-
tended to function Baudrillard highlights several 
principles, the key being that a “vowel has no 
right to figure within the Saturnine unless it has 
its counter vowel,”29 paralleling how there was 
no excessive (deferred) element in the primitive 
(symbolic) gift-exchange either. Distinguished 
from ordinary language, whose signs carry an 
excessive meaning in the interrelations and word 
associations made between signifiers, the poetic 
anagram ensures cancellation, hence the cru-
cial element of  the law, that “nothing remains of  
27 Jean Baudrillard, The Intelligence of  Evil, 16. 
28 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, 213-57. 
29 Ibid., 215.
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it.”30 Everything is effectively and smoothly ex-
changed without any general equivalent, unlike 
Baudrillard’s totalizing “code” whose exchange 
value must always have one.31 That the poetic 
is thereby “irreducible to the mode of  significa-
tion”32 is meant to elucidate the possibility for 
a language, mode of  communication, existing 
beyond the totalizing code, a way of  speaking 
beyond its “reality.” Yet, clearly, there are some 
apparent limitations. 
Foreshadowing his later nihilistic turn, it seems 
Baudrillard is quite happy to abandon the con-
cepts of  “value,” progress, meaning and so on 
in his strategy of  “poetic” resistance against 
signification. The poetic is heavily reduced and, 
in its turn, restricted to a specific logic, one 
which challenges the system’s code but only in 
its nihilism, ensuring “nothing remains of  it.” 
To be more specific, it is a variant of  nihilism 
paralleled by Georges Bataille’s theory of  excess. 
Bataille proposes that “Man’s disregard for the 
material basis of  his life […] assigns to the forc-
es it employs an end which they cannot have. 
Beyond our immediate ends, man’s activity in 
fact pursues the useless and infinite fulfillment 
of  the universe,” suggesting moreover that “if  
the system can no longer grow […] it must nec-
essarily be lost without profit; it must be spent, 
willingly or not, gloriously or catastrophically.”33 
Comparing this to Baudrillard’s anagrams, there 
is both a sense of  the futility of  projects beyond 
their immediate functionality (the gift-exchange, 
or the vowel and the counter vowel) and also 
of  the need for a complete return, or sacrifice, 
whether that be poetic or literal. In either the 
system’s code, or Baudrillard’s anagrams, there 
remains no possibility for a subject not immedi-
ately and completely returned (sacrificed/lost). 
Whilst this may be an improvement on the sys-
tem’s reproduction, simulating only its own signs 
30 Ibid., 218. 
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Georges Bataille, The Accursed Share: Volume 1 (New York: 
Zone Books, 2013), 21.
of  functionality (“meaning” and so on), Baudril-
lard’s poetic language cannot transmit meaning 
beyond its functionality (its structural system) 
either. It remains difficult to envisage how it can 
offer sufficient solutions for long-term plan-
ning, something desperately needed to face up 
to modern threats of  ecological catastrophe, 
mass poverty and so on. 
Whilst such global resource shortages and in-
equalities mean Baudrillard and Bataille are un-
doubtedly right to raise the significance of  the 
“material basis” for our lives (and our general 
misunderstandings of  it), one must be sceptical 
of  strategies not facilitating global mobilization 
needed to address that which is so significant. 
If  Baudrillard finds a route back to symbolic 
exchange only in old, generally long discarded, 
Latin poetic forms and examples of  ritual prac-
tice, potlatch, etc. these should be treated as little 
more than the “dreaming” depicted by Best and 
Kellner before. There is no obvious possibility 
of  return, and primitivism offers no adequate 
replacement for the failed Third Worldism Gilles 
Deleuze and Félix Guattari were so critical of, 
disparaging the withdrawal from the world mar-
ket as “a curious revival of  the fascist ‘economic 
solution’,” urging us instead “to go further,”34 
rather than seek naïve escape in the sheer con-
tingency of  such perceived withdrawal. 
The anagrammatic strategy is unsatisfactory 
and its parallels with Bataille perhaps foreshad-
ow Baudrillard’s own obsession with excess 
and transgression, something which Lyotard in 
“Energumen Capitalism” convincingly critiqued 
in terms of  its impotence.35 Such failure in this 
regard is even more apparent coming to fatal 
strategy, where interrelated critiques will receive 
further address.   
34 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism 
and Schizophrenia, trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and 
Helen R. Lane (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013), 
276. 
35 Jean- François Lyotard, “Energumen Capitalism,” in 
#Accelerate: The Accelerationist Reader, trans. and ed. Robin 
Mackay and Armen Avanessian, 2nd edn. (Falmouth: 
Urbanomic, 2017), 203. 
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Fatal strategy
Best and Kellner interpret “fatal” strategy as the 
pursuit of  “a course of  action or trajectory to 
its extreme, attempting to surpass its limits, to 
go beyond its boundaries.”36 This approach is, 
in a broader and more ambiguous way, present 
as early as For a Critique of  the Political Economy 
of  the Sign, where there is already a hint of  the 
extremity which must supposedly be reached if  
one seeks to overcome the “functional and ter-
rorist organization of  the control of  meaning.”37 
Radical action must, according to Baudrillard, 
take place through a “total revolution, theoret-
ical and practical” where even signs, the system 
of  language itself, “must burn.”38 Yet, it remains 
unclear precisely what this “revolution” must 
look like and, as Baudrillard’s career progressed, 
his conception of  “total revolution,” or even if  
it should be revolutionary at all, would vary quite 
significantly. Revolutionary strategy became fa-
tal strategy and two key exemplars of  this are 
in terror and the turn to the radicalized object.
The question of  terror is prevalent in Bau-
drillard’s work and his understanding of  the 
phenomenon is quite complex. To begin, the 
relationship between evil and terror should be 
considered since, as Baudrillard puts it, “the real 
problem, the only problem, is: where did Evil 
go? And the answer is: everywhere.”39 Elucidat-
ing this, there are parallels which can be drawn 
between Baudrillard and his compatriot Alain 
Badiou, who challenges the contemporary un-
derstanding of  evil similarly, arguing that the en-
tirety of  “contemporary ethical ideology is root-
ed in the consensual self-evidence of  Evil.”40 
Evil is seen as an a priori determination which 
is only the grounding for a “stodgy conserva-
tivism” that “prohibits every broad, positive vi-
36 Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory, 131. 
37 Jean Baudrillard, For A Critique, 163 [199].
38 Ibid. 
39 Jean Baudrillard, Transparency, 81.
40 Alain Badiou, Ethics, trans. Peter Hallward, (London: 
Verso, 2001), 58.  
sion of  possibilities”41 in strategy. This could be 
read as a tendency amongst ethicists to reduce 
conceptions of  Evil down towards a general 
equivalency (sign of  Evil) against which every-
thing can be measured, such as, for example, the 
horrors of  Nazi Germany. Yet, as Badiou lucidly 
suggested, this is just to “subordinate the ques-
tion of  Evil,”42 not to truly address it. Evil is 
not found in a “measure without measure”43 of  
a general equivalent but rather as a multiplicity 
of  singularities irreducible to a single measure. 
There are many types of  Evil, but the “code” 
of  the system, in Baudrillardian terms, reduces 
it merely to one and, as Baudrillard claims, man 
can thereby no longer speak of  Evil, but merely 
“discourse on the rights of  man – a discourse 
which is pious, weak, useless and hypocritical.”44 
Terror, conversely, can be understood as symp-
tomatic of  a society where adequate expressions 
of  systematic evil seem impossible and only “vi-
olent form[s] of  abreaction”45 are conceivable 
alternatives to the code. If  evil is “everywhere,” 
the only transgressive act becomes a (fatal) ter-
rorism which is, in a sense, merely a more accel-
erated, perhaps the most accelerated, form of  the 
system itself. This does not necessarily make ter-
ror a potent strategy though, and it can be said, 
as Baudrillard does, that terrorism already “ex-
ists potentially in the emptiness of  the screen,”46 
that is, in that which is made possible and ne-
cessitated by mediatization. It is thus not really 
an external force to capitalism but, as previously 
suggested, a symptom of  it: “such violence is not 
so much an event as the explosive form assumed 
by an absence of  events,”47 an absence imma-
nent to the system. There is, however, crucially 
still a sense in which the system doesn’t want to 
be pushed towards its own limits and to push it 
41 Ibid., 14.
42 Ibid., 63. 
43 Ibid.
44 Jean Baudrillard, Transparency, 85.
45 Ibid., 75. 
46 Ibid.
47 Ibid., 76. 
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in this way is, thereby, still more radical than to 
attempt merely to negate the system in favour 
of  coordinates assumed to be more “natural” or 
objective. 
By accepting the represented (assumed “natu-
ral”) logic of  the system and categories of  la-
bor, it seemed to Baudrillard as if  “capital itself  
whispered these pedantic distinctions to Marx, 
while never being stupid enough to believe in 
them itself.”48 Instead, capitalism, as Baudrillard 
identified it, was concerned purely with the re-
production of  the sign of  labor, not with labor 
purported ends. On this basis alone, there might 
have been some radicality found within acts of  
extreme violence, against an economic situation 
where “life [itself  is] taking death hostage,”49 re-
producing again and again the repressive sign of  
labor and the exploitative systems accompany-
ing it within modern capitalism. The fatal act of  
terrorist violence is thereby an act refusing these 
coordinates, of  reproduction and the identity of  
the same, becoming instead a symbolic act. Yet, at 
the same time, escaping identity becomes here 
merely a choice of  passive capitalist participa-
tion or nihilistic destruction, with no hope of  
truly escaping or evading the code. Terrorism, 
then, is still purely nihilistic. 
Whilst the function of  death in Baudrillard’s 
primitive society saw its members living with 
their dead “under the auspices of  the ritual and 
the feast,”50 the ritual function of  killing (sacri-
fice) is quite distinct from anything modern, all 
existing within a dual-relation now having been 
extinguished. Violent terrorism is, conversely, 
merely a “monstrous double”51 of  this primitive 
form, having no potent methodology for sus-
tained liberation at all. Interestingly, however, 
Baudrillard attempts a rekindling of  “terroristic” 
strategy from the angle of  what this inquiry has 
48 Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic Exchange, 39. 
49 Ibid., 151. 
50 Ibid., 155. 
51 Jean Baudrillard, Intelligence of  Evil, 145. 
called theoretical terror. This has two key modes 
of  approach, both interconnected to some de-
gree. Firstly, it is a “fiction-theory”52 exploring 
a fatal logic with, perhaps, the hope of  engen-
dering a rupture bringing about a new proper 
dual (symbolic) relation. Secondly, employing el-
ements of  that former approach too, it is a turn 
towards the object and a radicalisation of  the 
fatality of  the subject. 
Considering the terror of  “fiction-theory,” this 
is exemplified in the later writings on Ameri-
ca,53 which Mike Gane argues to be “the most 
problematic of  all Baudrillard’s writing” and 
even amount to the “complete abandonment of  
academic, scientific styles of  work.”54 That it is 
“shocking to read” and a “rapid escalation of  
stakes”55 is notable and, perhaps, even a sugges-
tion of  its success in engendering a theoretical 
terror, albeit only if  it carries genuine strategic 
potential. Gane suggests that the “gains come in 
the theory of  simulation,” but from the perspec-
tive of  radicality this might rather be an even 
further fall into the trap of  impotent totalization, 
where “it is not even of  the slightest relevance to 
say, at this juncture the real world still exists.”56 
This reproach is convincing since there is no 
longer even any hinted gesture at positing a rev-
olutionary theory. A criticism of  “postmodern 
suspicion[s] of  positive programmes for social 
action and emancipation” being “a ‘mere trap’ 
for rejecting all forms of  politics and hence for 
supporting the present state of  affairs,”57 a view 
Best and Kellner trace to Félix Guattari, is there-
by even more damning. Fiction-theory might be 
defended insofar as by forcing “readers to expe-
rience the stifling incoherence of  a culture of  
simulacra […Baudrillard terrorizes the reader] 
52 Mike Gane, Baudrillard’s Bestiary: Baudrillard and Culture 
(London: Routledge, 2003), 94. 
53 Jean Baudrillard, America, trans. Chris Turner (London: 
Verso, 2010).
54 Mike Gane, Baudrillard’s Bestiary, 94. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory, 97. 
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forcing them to acknowledge the true nature of  
their culture,”58 as Anthony King suggests, yet 
this is still not a way out but instead, as King 
proposes, a way of  no longer situating modern 
capitalism in a historical context and instead ab-
solutizing it, believing its “own self-definition.”59 
This could only be defended if, in horror of  
this, the work understood as creative literature 
became able to mobilize action and open up 
the world to new possibilities. Yet this is pre-
cisely what King suggests is lacking, since “his 
later writing cannot really be said to be creative 
prose […] They do not open up a fragmented 
world, but rather stand back from that world, 
offering detached criticisms and generalizations 
about it.”60 Accepting this critique means agree-
ing that Baudrillard’s turn from representation 
of  the world, in standard academic mode, to a 
rejection of  the very notion of  “real world,” as 
Gane suggested, is still stuck in a representation-
al mode. The last fatal strategy, the theoretical 
terror engendered by turning away from the rep-
resentational subject towards the object shows 
the impotence of  such a strategy even if  it were 
to be actualized.  
The turn to the object is an attempt to capture 
and perhaps even accelerate what is termed the 
“revenge of  the object.”61 Kellner depicts this 
as “a bizarre metaphysical scenario concerning 
the triumph of  objects over subjects within the 
‘obscene’ proliferation of  an object world so 
completely out of  control that it surpasses all at-
tempts to understand, conceptualize and control 
58 Anthony King, Baudrillard’s Nihilism, 97.
59 Ibid., 94. 
60 Ibid., 99.
61 Guy Bellavance, “Revenge of  the Crystal: An Interview 
with Jean Baudrillard,” in Revenge of  the Crystal: Selected 
Writings on the Modern Object and its Destiny 1968-1983 ed. and 
trans. Paul Foss and Julian Pefanis (London: Pluto Press, 
1999), 18. 
it.”62 Whilst this metaphysical approach is not 
without interest,63 the inquiry here is concerned 
with whether it offers radical theoretical violence. 
Baudrillard draws on a “fatal reversibility of  the 
object” that “lies in wait for us”64 and this logic 
seems to make sense in terms of  questions of  
climate change and ecological catastrophe al-
though, again, it remains unclear why such an 
approach would actually properly rekindle sym-
bolic exchange in a way that makes escape seem 
conceivable. Rather, “fatal reversibility” appears 
only to signify a “fatal” solution instead of  an 
imaginative escape. If  the object for Baudril-
lard, as Kellner argued, “surpasses all attempts 
to understand,” then does this not render the 
crises and contradictions of  contemporary cap-
ital unsurpassable? In merely following or even 
accelerating this logic Bryan S. Turner and Chris 
Rojek are right in suggesting that “Baudrillard 
fatalistically [presents] himself  as a symptom in-
stead of  a solution,”65 and they draw attention 
here to Baudrillard’s writings on America too, 
where his “restless circling through the high-
ways of  America parallels the circlings of  the 
sign in the sign economy,”66 simply reproducing 
the same totalized inescapability.
Richard G. Smith identifies Baudrillard’s thought 
as an attempted “nonrepresentational theory,”67 
62 Douglas Kellner, “Jean Baudrillard,” The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of  Philosophy (Winter 2015), ed. Edward N. 
Zalta, <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/
entries/baudrillard/>.   
63 For a proper address of  the metaphysical/ontological 
significance of  objects in Baudrillard’s work see Matthew 
King, “Object-Oriented Baudrillard? Withdrawal and 
Symbolic Exchange,” Open Philosophy 2 (2019), 75-85.
64 Jean Baudrillard, Fatal Strategies, trans. Philip Beitchman 
and W. G. J. Niesluchowski, ed. Jim Fleming (London: 
Pluto Press, 1990), 72
65 Chris Rojek and Bryan S. Turner, “Introduction: Regret 
Baudrillard?” in Forget Baudrillard, ed. Chris Rojek and Bryan 
S. Turner (London: Routledge, 2004), xii.
66 Ibid. 
67 Richard G. Smith, “Baudrillard’s Nonrepresentational 
Theory,” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 21 
(2003), 69.
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and this mode is particularly apparent in these 
fatal strategies where Baudrillard turns away 
from the representational subject to try to es-
cape the logic of  the sign via acceleration of  the 
object’s revenge instead. Yet, in the two previous 
discussions, his writings were demonstrated not 
to have achieved a fully non-representational 
approach and, in analysing the revenge of  the 
object, regrasping symbolic exchange remained 
impotent and symptomatic rather than genuine-
ly theoretically violent as was hoped. This can 
all be explained by suggesting that symbolic ex-
change has become itself  a kind of  “haunting” 
failure for Baudrillard, a “real kernel” that only 
acts as an alibi for sign exchange in the same 
way that Sr functioned for Sd and EV for UV. 
In fact, the critique of  Baudrillard’s totalizing 
logic of  the regime of  the sign, the code, could 
find a new expression in precisely the idea that 
such totalization is only assumed to be the case 
(by Baudrillard or by us, in more pessimistic 
moments) insofar as one remains stuck in that 
earlier ideological relationship shifted to an even 
more fundamental structure (decision) of  sign 
and symbolic exchange themselves. 
However, if  there is no return to classical theory 
and if, in a nihilistic age, there seems no escape 
from the bind of  the end times and imminent 
catastrophe (even and especially in fatal strate-
gy), it should not mean giving up entirely nor 
returning to naivety instead. Rather, diagnosing 
symbolic and sign exchange as a philosophi-
cal “decision,” a unilateral dualysis might, with 
non-philosophical work, (re-)conceive of  a 
Real irreducible to capitalist reality but without 
returning to naïve “objective” representation. 
This is the turn to Laruelle and non-Baudrillard 
that will now be attempted. The heretical, the-
oretically violent, solution is not in a return to 
representational theory, but going still further 
and, in Laruelle scholar Ray Brassier’s terminol-
ogy, “unbinding the void”68 structuring manifes-
68 Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 97.
tation and representation as such. The classical 
(revolutionary) subject seems impotent in the 
face of  continued failures and Baudrillardian 
critique, but the removal of  resistant subjectivity 
altogether proves naïve. Instead, there is per-
haps room for a different kind of  subjectivity, a 
subject now as a collective orientation of  praxis, 
something for which a non-Baudrillard might 
lay fertile ground. 
Non-Baudrillard
A brief  orientation in Laruellian discourse is 
first required, preparing for the dense content 
that follows. For Laruelle the major limitation of  
standard philosophy is its decisional character, 
wherein “philosophy claims to determine itself  
beyond all its empirical determinations,” such 
determinations already being prescribed by itself  
via an “auto-validation.”69 The decision leaves 
no counter-gift to the system (in Baudrillardian 
terms) and thus puts everything at the service 
of  philosophy rather than at the service of  man. 
Instead, non-philosophy aims to “found philos-
ophy on man rather than the inverse, venture 
a history of  the human existent that no longer 
owes anything to unitary prejudices.”70 It seeks 
to recover that which is “anterior to all deci-
sion”71 and the process of  achieving this is called 
cloning. To clone a decision one must identify a 
unilateral dualysis wherein an identity in-the-last-in-
stance to the Real-One is possible. To achieve this, 
the terms are (re-)considered “as transcendental 
theorems insofar as they constitute the unilateral 
duality that accomplishes this identity,”72 as the-
orems of  philosophy but no longer ones held to 
be sufficient. Given this, duality is “unilateral”73 
69 François Laruelle, Principles of  Non-Philosophy, trans. Nicola 
Rubczak and Anthony Paul Smith (London: Bloomsbury, 
2017), 4.
70 François Laruelle, “Rigorous Science,” 46. 
71 François Laruelle, “What Is Non-Philosophy?” in From 
Decision to Heresy, trans. Taylor Adkins, 186. 
72 François Laruelle, “A Summary of  Non-Philosophy” in 
From Decision to Heresy, trans. Ray Brassier, 290, sec. 2.1.5-
2.1.6. 
73 Ibid. 
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since it is in-the-last-instance identical (to) the 
Real-One. This cloning carried out on the basis 
of  a vision-in-One, grasping at this Real-One in 
its foreclosure from philosophical thought.   
This inquiry proposes cloning symbolic ex-
change and sign exchange, gift and counter-gift 
to generate two first names, each producing some 
new axioms. This is followed by a brief  elucida-
tion of  why such dualysis functions (and how 
identity is only in-the-last-instance). The theo-
retical violence that this offers the inquiry will 
then be made apparent. 
Non-philosophical dualysis 
First names are for Laruelle “non-conceptual 
symbols [cloned] on the basis of  the intuitive 
and naïve concepts of  philosophy,” but with the 
aim of  “the suspension of  their philosophical 
sense.”74 To realize a non-Baudrillard, it is nec-
essary to propose first names in order to sus-
pend the “naïve concepts” of  Baudrillard’s phi-
losophy, which resulted only in fatal strategies 
and radical impotence, but without abandoning 
his contemporary import or theoretical insight. 
Non-Baudrillard aims to propose a non-fatal vi-
sion-in-One irreducible to the manifest decision 
of  signified/signifier or symbolic exchange/sign 
exchange, the latter of  which being only a re-en-
gendering of  the problems of  the former, as sug-
gested earlier. Two first names of  a non-Baudril-
lard might be “exchanged-without-exchange” 
and “(counter-)gifted-without-giftedness.”
1. exchanged-without-exchange. This is a 
first name for the Real but from the angle 
of  exchange and exchangeability. The Real 
is “exchanged-without-exchange” and from 
this the following axioms can be formu-
lated: a) there is a fundamental exchanged 
which in its very fundamentality excludes 
exchange, b) because it is exchanged-with-
74 François Laruelle, Dictionary of  Non-Philosophy, trans. 
Taylor Adkins (Minneapolis: Univocal, 2013), 150. 
out-exchange and (in)-One, it does not ex-
change in or outside of  itself. 
2. (counter-)gifted-without-giftedness. 
This is another first name for the Real, 
now cloned from Baudrillard’s philosophi-
cal concepts of  the gift (of  capitalism) and 
the counter-gift (thus far only having been 
fatal). The Real is “(counter-)gifted-with-
out-giftedness and from this the following 
axiom can be formulated: c) there is a fun-
damental (counter-)gifted which in its very 
fundamentality excludes the giftedness (of  
capitalism). 
These are attempts at capturing the immanency 
of  the One prior to decision, in other words, 
of  splitting “the identity of  thought, on the one 
hand, and those practical consequences that 
thought habitually enunciates or programmes 
for the world, on the other,”75 splitting the men-
tal repetition and (re-)instantiation of  a pro-
gramme of  (gifted) contemporary capital (and 
sign exchange) from an identity of  collective or 
immanent thought (collective insofar as private 
language is impossible). This reveals that the 
decisions were only regionally determinate and 
thus absolutely indeterminate (in-the-last-in-
stance) with regard to the identity of  the Real. 
Yet how does the unilateral duality of  each, 
guaranteeing identity only in-the-last-instance, 
function? 
Taking first exchanged-without-exchange, its 
unilateral dualysis can be established, addressing 
the apparent aporia of  impossible exchange and 
sign exchange, by guaranteeing sign exchange 
through granting it an autonomy but relative to a 
fundamental or “transcendental essence,”76 located 
in the (symbolically-)exchanged-without-(sign-)
exchange. Cloning on this basis escapes, or rath-
er transcendentalizes, the deferral of  sign exchange 
75 François Laruelle, “What Can Non-Philosophy Do?” 
Angelaki 8, no. 2 (2003), 182. 
76 François Laruelle, Principles, 23. 
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by a radically exchanged of  the One that is “ab-
solutely outside-Being or outside-thought.”77 
That is, whilst sign exchange retains relative au-
tonomy, there is a demonstrated “unilateral char-
acter of  the causality of  the first over the sec-
ond,”78 as Laruelle would put it, which unbinds 
the exchanged itself  from the absolute suprema-
cy of  the sign (exchange). Likewise, the reversal 
of  the giftedness of  capitalism in-the-last-in-
stance to an already (counter-)gifted of  the One 
makes capitalism only an occasional cause of  the 
Real. The decision is not closed or sufficient and 
rather “is no longer primary or determining; it 
is instead unilaterally directed by a now radical 
undecided,”79 already counter-gifted by the One 
which is in-the-last-instance exchanged with it, 
at least, when rendered undecided by the vision-
in-One. 
Where, then, is the possible conditioning of  a 
new subject, understood as a practical and ori-
ented conditioning of  collective action? This 
new “subject” should be founded as immanent 
to the radically undecided in-the-last-instance of  
exchanged-without-exchange, as a counter-gift 
against capital, but it is unclear that Laruelle’s 
non-philosophy offers the true theoretical vi-
olence by which to bring this through, since it 
perhaps lacks the “monstrosity” (returning to 
the Deleuzian term) of  radical breakage or re-
fusal. Thus, a few remarks on a provisionally 
named man-to-come will be given returning to 
a general register, albeit one now “unbound” 
from the decision of  capitalist sign exchange 
and ready to grasp philosophy as a tool for new 
and more radical trajectories. 
Man-to-come (the counter-gift)
This concluding section takes up contemporary 
questioning concerning revolutionary structural 
change and the obstacles this faces. It strives to 
77 Ibid. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 25. 
substantiate that an unbounded non-Baudrillard, 
exchanged-without-exchange and (counter-)gift-
ed-without-giftedness, may offer the theoretical 
violence prerequisite to face them. 
One specific problem encountered by those 
proposing structural revolution is an essential-
ly theoretical one, concerning predicting life’s 
requirements under post-capitalism and de-
veloping new structures which can mutate to 
meet emerging demands whilst simultaneously 
addressing the transitioning from current con-
ditions. In Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams’ 
#Accelerate, a bold vision for non-sentimental 
“Promethean politics”80 is declared, proposing 
an employment of  technological automation to 
meet growing societal demands within an accel-
erated post-capitalist future. Yet this politics is 
not inevitable with technological progress but 
rather necessitates “post-capitalist planning” 
needing “both a cognitive map of  the existing 
system and a speculative image of  the future 
economic system,”81 the latter imagined from 
outside the apparent sufficiency of  the present. 
There are two key points of  concern, one of  a 
contemporary “map” and one of  a future “im-
age,” but it can be argued that a non-Baudrillard-
ian project provides interesting clarifications and 
strategic approaches with both.  
Initially, non-Baudrillard can aid the develop-
ment of  a “cognitive map” of  the present via 
understanding and reframing the logic of  sign 
exchange and code found to play a key part in 
modern capitalist functionality. The reframing 
of  sign exchange shows that it can characterize 
a logic or tendency of  philosophy and intersub-
jective communication under capitalism without 
sufficiently overdetermining all disciplines and 
practices tout court. This is because unilateral du-
ality between symbolic and sign exchange does 
80 Nick Srnicek and Alex Williams, “#Accelerate: Manifesto 
for an Accelerationist Politics,” #Accelerate: The Accelerationist 
Reader, ed. Robin Mackay and Armen Avanessian, 2nd ed. 
(Falmouth: Urbanomic, 2017), 360.
81 Ibid., 356.
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not require repeating a naïve position but rather 
permits, in-the-last-instance, identity to and thus 
non-sufficiency over other regional domains of  
knowledge production. This allows the philo-
sophical analysis of  a precession of  simulacra 
and the regime of  the sign under capitalism (and 
the disappearance of  symbolic exchange which 
is also an anthropological analysis) to comple-
ment, or rather be complemented by, alternative 
knowledge-producing practices such as scientif-
ic endeavors, normative formulation and tech-
nological creation. This becomes crucial, partic-
ularly in the context of  a Promethean project 
referred to above, since it permits an unbinding 
of  regional sciences or practices from the sign 
exchange as totalizing logic and thus permits al-
ternative knowings to map the delineations of  
such logic, firstly, but also, secondly, begins to 
speculate on an image of  possible escape.
Furthermore, non-Baudrillard unbinds the 
possibility for a radical counter-gift founded 
in practices immanent to the Real from which 
a subject, non-representational collective, in fi-
delity to them can turn against capitalism. The 
possibilities unlocked by technological knowl-
edge production (unconfined by semiotic cap-
italism) were already mentioned briefly with 
relation to Srnicek and Williams, but another in-
terconnected broader example can be found in 
Brassier. He suggests how unbinding a scientific 
image from the manifest (phenomenological, 
for Brassier) image provides major theoretical 
and pragmatic advantages.82 Likewise, unbind-
ing scientific knowledge-making practices from 
sign exchange, in the service of  a more utopian 
and collective knowledge production, no longer 
reproducing the same oppressive structuration, 
seems similarly advantageous. The suprema-
cy of  the sign is already exchanged-for by the 
counter-gift of  such practices, whose immanent 
potential need only be brought out – this is what 
a non-Baudrillard legitimates.  
Lastly, therefore, non-Baudrillard takes form, 
82 Ray Brassier, Nihil Unbound.
as its new subject, in this very act of  returning 
to immanent regional knowings anew, from 
the perspective of  a man-to-come recogniz-
ing philosophical and capitalist insufficiency in 
a double sense: decision as insufficient in-the-
last-instance and capitalist sign exchange as in-
sufficient normatively, as being inadequate to 
knowledge production by proliferating the lim-
itations of  the manifest image and, according to 
Srnicek and Williams, holding back technologi-
cal progress too.83 This facilitates both aspects 
of  post-capitalist planning and is genuinely 
theoretically violent insofar as it does violence 
to common theory, refusing to accept naïve or 
impotent theorizations by returning to classical 
subjectivity or accepting the totalizing logic pre-
sented fatally by Baudrillard. It offers a (count-
er-)gift to the giftedness of  capital in the form 
of  a violent “terrorizing” of  congealed thinking 
and an opening of  heretical strategy, or at least 
more democratic knowledge production, the 
speculative site of  this new subject this article 
proposes. The work of  establishing this having 
barely begun, but a speculative groundwork at 
least now laid. 
Conclusion 
Reinvigorating a thinking of  an escape from the 
end times requires proposing a counter-gift of-
fering theoretical violence against the manifest 
and closed imagination of  theory and capital-
ism’s status quo. This involves re-interrogating 
Baudrillard’s thinking with regard to sign and 
symbolic exchange, gift and counter-gift but 
a rejection of  his fatal strategies as being only 
superficially terroristic towards the manifest, 
ultimately only pushing totalization and self-de-
struction further. Escaping this, a non-Baudril-
lard was proposed which cloned Baudrillard’s 
concepts into the structures of  unilateral dual-
yses which suspended their philosophical suffi-
ciency. This opens up the potential for a new 
subject through an unbinding of  the manifest, 
the beginnings of  which being examined specu-
83 Srnicek and Williams, #Accelerate, 335, sec. 03.3. 
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latively under the name of  a man-to-come. 
Assembling all this together entailed examining 
the conditions of  a counter-gift immanent and 
already-exchanged within exchange itself, sug-
gested to be located in the plurality of  knowl-
edge practices, capable of  engineering a non-to-
talizing escape. Future inquiry must push further 
still, rejecting the sufficiency of  philosophy not 
at the service of  man, but also pushing for a 
subject and image of  man (and man in capital-
ism) which is no longer classically human, with 
all its histories of  racial and gendered exclusions, 
but rather (in-)human. An (in-)human pragmatic 
subject as given in the radicality of  its knowl-
edge practices, not from a presumed essence lo-
cated in our primitive past. 
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